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Abstract
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) institutions are con-
sistent with a New Consensus that emerged in the 1980s, limiting
the role for macroeconomic (particularly fiscal) policy to short term
stabilizations by means of rules. I will argue that the policy inertia
induced by the Consensus may have played a role in the disappointing
performance of EMU economies even before the crisis.
The crisis of the Consensus, and the debate on secular stagnation,
proved that Keynesian (and possibly) persistent excesses of savings
over investment may hamper growth. This has put fiscal policy back
to the center of the scene, and given the General Theory, at eighty, a
second youth. I will argue therefore that the EMU fiscal rule should be
amended to allow semi-permanent negative government savings. I will
finally argue that a modified Golden Rule may serve this objective,
and allow EU-wide policy coordination. This seems the only reason-
able reform with some chances of being adopted by the EU divided
policy makers.
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1 Introduction
The annual gathering of central bankers at Jackson Hole is usually closely
watched, because it announces policy changes, and in general it reveals the
mood of central bankers. The August 2016 meeting was no exception. Even
if no major policy shift was announced, a cry for help came from the sympo-
sium, as central bankers made it clear that they were running out of ammuni-
tions in fighting deflationary pressures and global stagnant growth (Fleming
2016).
A number of issues seems to worry, more or less explicitly, central bankers.
First, while conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures have
somewhat worked, in that they made (almost) impossible for financial institu-
tions to hoard cash and to restrain from lending, they were almost completely
ineffective in boosting private sector confidence and in restarting credit de-
mand. Second, having brought almost to the limit their capacity to fight
deflation, central banks are increasingly worried by the possibility of a new
shock, that would find them powerless. Third, and related, monetary policy
cannot fight the battle alone, and a bolder role for other policies is called for.
In particular, fiscal policy is the “new” kid in town, back from the cave were
it had been buried in the 1980s after the rational expectations revolution.
But two other questions, for the moment hidden underneath the surface,
seem to contribute to the central bankers’ sleepless nights. The first, related
to the new debate on secular stagnation is: what if we live in a “new normal”,
made of low potential growth and near-zero equilibrium interest rates? What
would the consequences be for the policy mix? This worry is compounded by
a second unspoken question which is how to heal the sick man of the world
economy, the EMU.
The gloomy mood of central bankers reflects among other things a lack
of theoretical framework of analysis. The pre-crisis consensus that framed
macroeconomic policy has been challenged by the crisis, most notably in two
respects: (a) monetary policy dominance is over; and (b) the superiority of
rules over discretionary policies is challenged.
This paper will try to assess the consequences of this reshuﬄing of the
consensus for the EMU, that is built precisely on both fiscal and monetary
rules, and on monetary dominance. In section 2 I will highlight the building
blocks of the consensus, and show how they impregnated the institutions that
were designed with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 to govern the European
Union. Section 3 will then argue that these institutions forced policy inertia,
and that this policy inertia should be considered when assessing the relative
macroeconomic performance of the EMU, as compared with the US, both
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before and after the crisis. Then, I will tackle the issue of secular stagnation
(section 4), and of its implication for fiscal policy. This will lead me, in
section 5, to argue that the EMU should adopt a looser fiscal rule, most
notably excluding investment from deficit figures. This rule, I will argue,
may also become a tool for coordinating and implementing much needed
EU-wide industrial policies.
2 The Crisis and the End of Consensus Macroe-
conomics
2.1 The Pre-Crisis Consensus
After the rational expectations revolution of the 1970s, New Classical Macroe-
conomics, and most notably Real Business Cycle (RBC) Theory, dominated
the intellectual (and political) landscape for more than a decade. The main
innovation of these models with respect to the pre-Keynesian neoclassical
theory was the incorporation of rational expectations in a Walrasian frame-
work, in which demand disturbances played no role. Within this stream of
research, income fluctuations where the optimal result of optimizing agents’
reaction to supply side disturbances (“technological shocks”, as broadly de-
fined).
RBC models nevertheless ran into methodological and empirical prob-
lems, such as the fact that long business cycles seemed difficult to explain if
agents were rational and fully informed. Furthermore, the ambition of RBC
models to explain co-movement in macroeconomic variables turned into a
major problem when the approach was shown not to fit some basic regular-
ities, such as the fact that interest rates, or the propensity to save, during
slumps move in the opposite direction than predicted by the theory (Phelps
1990, pp.86-90).
Together with the difficulties of RBC models, emerged an the attempt to
recover Keynesian features in microfounded models, in which imperfections
of various nature could cause departures of demand from natural output (see
e.g. the papers collected in Mankiw and Romer 1991). The economics profes-
sion therefore evolved towards what might be called a “New Consensus” that
blends a short run with Keynesian features, and a long run where supply-side
factors are dominant (Blanchard 1997). This consensus has a representation
in standard macroeconomics undergraduate textbooks, that are usually split
in two independent parts1.
1It may be noticed that the crisis also triggered an interesting discussion on how macroe-
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The typical tools of the New Consensus, widely used by academics and
by international institutions, are the so-called Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) models, that embed in a RBC structure a number of
nominal rigidities and imperfections: these models most commonly feature
price and wage rigidities, accompanied by the existence of a number of con-
sumers who are unwilling or incapable of maximizing utility over time, the
so-called Non-Ricardian consumers. Rigidities in turn allow for the appear-
ance of significant demand shortages, and hence of Keynesian features, that
are nevertheless limited to the short run. Furthermore, central banks have an
impact on the economy, because rigid prices fail to instantaneously adapt to
nominal interest changes and the real interest rate therefore can be at least
in the short run impacted by monetary policy choices. Going through the
many facets of the New Consensus is well beyond the scope of this paper2.
What is relevant for our purposes is that the New Consensus has developed a
number of results that are independent of the features of individual models:
1. The baseline model is the Real Business Cycle model in which fluctu-
ations are determined by the optimal reaction of agents to supply side
shocks, most notably technological shocks, and are hence to be con-
sidered “natural”. Market imperfections and rigidities may cause this
natural equilibrium to be different from the Paretian first-best. Rigidi-
ties and imperfections may have different sources: efficiency wages,
staggered price and wage setting, incomplete markets, search and bar-
gaining, information asymmetries, imperfect competition, liquidity con-
straints or coordination problems, are some of the many imperfections
that can be embedded in otherwise standard rational expectations mod-
els to yield departures of the natural rate from the the Pareto optimum.
2. To increase the natural growth rate of the economy, and to make the
natural equilibrium converge to the first best, policy needs to eliminate
the rigidities through the very same structural reforms that were called
for by New Classical macroeconomists.
3. Market imperfections, mainly nominal rigidities, also cause short run
departures from the natural growth rate, to yield demand-driven busi-
ness cycle fluctuations in the short run. More precisely, when the econ-
omy is hit by a shock, imperfections prevent agents from reacting to
the shock optimally, remaining on the natural output path.
conomics should be taught (Blanchard 2016).
2A good starting point for the interested reader are two papers by Olivier Blanchard
(2000, 2009); see also Woodford (2009).
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4. The short run deviations from natural output tend to be reabsorbed in
the medium run by markets through (mostly price and wage) flexibility.
5. Discretionary macroeconomic policies are ineffective to stabilize eco-
nomic activity. Rules are to be preferred because they make policy
predictable and hence easier to embed in agents’ expectations.
6. Monetary policy should be preferred to fiscal policy mostly for two rea-
sons. First, it is less subject to lags in decision and in implementation;
second, it can be delegated to independent and technocratic bodies that
are not subject to political biases and capture by vested interests. Fur-
thermore, monetary policy aimed at stabilizing inflation will in most
cases also keep output at its optimal level (what Blanchard and Gal´ı
2007 call “divine coincidence”), thus making any further policy inter-
vention unnecessary.
7. Short run fluctuations of natural output have little, if any, influence on
long run growth, as there is no reason for supply side determinants to
be affected by temporary deviations from the optimal path.
The scope of this paper is not to ask “how Keynesian” is the New Key-
nesian theory that lies beneath the New Consensus. It is enough to notice
here that the answer would be “not much”, as the model only allows tem-
porary deviations from a framework in which market forces spontaneously
tend, if left alone, towards a first (or second) best that constitutes the best
of possible worlds.
In particular, and this is instead very relevant for the argument of this
paper, the New Consensus embraces the RBC rejection of sustained and per-
sistent excesses of savings over investment, which were the central feature of
Keynes’ General Theory (1936). Precisely the impossibility to generate such
persistent demand shortages, explains the fact that, after the crisis the New
Consensus has been challenged in many quarters, including by economists
that contributed to its development.
2.2 EMU Institutions and the New Consensus
While monetary policy may play some role in smoothing the cycle, the New
Consensus removed fiscal policy, even in the short run, from the set of tools
available to policy makers. Theoretical and empirical work on fiscal policy,
therefore, focused on the design of “optimal” rules (see Kopits and Syman-
sky 1998) aimed at preventing opportunistic behaviours and excessive (dis-
tortionary) weight of the government in the economy.
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The New Consensus shaped European institutions, that were put in place
with the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s. The Treaty centred European
economic governance on the rejection of active macroeconomic policies:
• Embracing the “divine coincidence”, the ECB only was given a man-
date for price stability, furthermore with considerable autonomy in pur-
suing it.
• Furthermore, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) forces countries to
rely solely on automatic stabilizers to cushion economic fluctuations.
The SGP requires countries to balance their balance over the cycle,
which means that only cyclical deficits are allowed.
• Last, but not last, the Maastricht Treaty gives the Commission a strong
saying in competition policies, with the objective of favouring structural
reforms and removing obstacles to the efficient working of markets.
By contrast, in the United States, the Full Employment and Balanced
Act of 1978 (the Humphrey-Hawkins Act) amended the Federal Reserve Act
in establishing a dual objective of price stability and full employment for
monetary policy. At the same time, attempts to introduce a fiscal rule for
the US government have never been successful. This is not surprising as
the US Federal government has an important stabilization role to play in
absorbing asymmetric shocks hitting the States that, with the exception of
Vermont, have very strict fiscal rules.
I will argue in the next section that these institutional differences may
have played a role in explaining the relatively poor performance of the EMU
before and during the crisis.
2.3 The Consensus: Unfit to Deal with the Crisis
The global financial crisis has shaken the consensus in many respects. Exces-
sive private debt emerged as a trigger of the crisis when the difficulties of a
relatively small segment of credit markets (subprime loans) triggered a race
to recapitalization and deleveraging, and then a generalized fall in the price of
financial assets. The difficulties of the financial sector was then transmitted
to the real economy through credit tightening by banks in difficulty, and the
fall in demand by consumers and businesses whose wealth had evaporated.
Following the unfolding of the crisis, that started with a near-collapse of
the financial sector, the first shortcoming of DSGE models to be pointed out
was their inability to embed meaningful financial sector behaviour, and the
appearance of bubbles.
5
When the crisis eventually evolved into a recession, via the credit crunch,
it is the macroeonomic properties of the New Consensus framework that came
under scrutiny. The balance-sheet recession (Koo 2011), a massive negative
wealth effect, could hardly be understood, and tackled, by means of the New
Consensus supply-based models. There was much more than nominal and
real rigidities could account for, in the dramatic demand shortage of 2008-
2009.
Two of the New Consensus policy results were therefore challenged by
the crisis3: First, the predominance of rules over discretionary policy, as
the downturn was so deep that monetary rules quickly hit the zero-lower-
bound (ZLB), and fiscal rules stopped applying because of the exceptional
circumstances embedded in the Stability Pact. Second, monetary dominance
ceased to exist, and fiscal policy made it back, at least temporarily, into the
policy makers’ toolbox.
The New Consensus monetary dominace is the reason why most coun-
tries, when the crisis began in 2007-2008, favoured monetary policy to try
to contrast the recession. The prompt intervention of central banks through
massive credit to financial institutions, was successful in that it prevented the
meltdown of the financial sector. This injection nevertheless, was ineffective
to restart the economy. In the process of deleveraging, banks, businesses and
households shrank their balance sheet, thus reducing liquidity at a faster pace
than credit was increased by central banks, which was therefore not turned
into demand for goods and services (Adrian and Shin 2010). The liquidity
trap, came back from history books4, and made monetary policy lose trac-
tion, as was clear by the end of 2008. In line with Keynes’ prescriptions,
fiscal policy then took the witness; in the spring of 2009, most advanced and
emerging economies implemented massive stimulus plans that supported de-
mand and put the economy on a recovery path, even if at the price of a
generalized deterioration of public finances.
The coordinated fiscal expansion was fruitful, and is credited with trig-
gering the recovery (Eichengreen and O’Rourke 2009). But as soon as the
acute phase of the crisis was over, the fear of deficits and debt caused a
quick reversal of the policy stance. The turn towards austerity was par-
ticularly brutal in Europe (see section 3.4), where the crisis in peripheral
3In fact, the crisis did challenge most tenets of the New Consensus (see e.g. Ostry,
Loungani, and Furceri 2016). Here, I will focus on the ones that are relevant for the
argument current paper.
4Japan in fact stands to show that the liquidity trap should never have been relegated
to history books. The decade-long Japanese stagnation was nevertheless considered by the
Consensus at the apex of its influence to be specific of an inefficient institutional system.
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countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) was interpreted as a fiscal profli-
gacy story, and therefore “cured” with fiscal consolidation. The US were not
exempt from a policy reversal; the sequester of 2013 marked the beginning
of a fiscal contraction that many judged premature. Nevertheless, as we will
see in the next section, the timing of this contraction made it remarkably
less destructive than in the EMU.
3 EMU vs USA: A Tale of Policy Inertia
3.1 Chasing the United States
The two largest world economies, the United States and the Economic and
Monetary Union, constitute a convenient natural experiment in that they
have similar economic “fundamentals” (productivity, wealth, financial struc-
ture), but also different institutional settings. In particular, as we said, while
in the EMU fiscal policy is constrained by a rule, in the US fiscal authorities
retain full discretionality.
Table 1 reports yearly average growth rates of GDP and CPI, together
with average unemployment over the same periods. Focusing for the mo-
Table 1: Selected Macroeconomic Variables, 1999-2015
1999-2015 1999-2007 2008-2015
CPI
USA 2.4% 2.8% 1.5%
EMU 1.9% 2.2% 1.3%
EMU 1.3% 2.2% 0.1%
GDP
USA 2.3% 2.9% 1.4%
UNEMP
USA 6.1% 5.0% 7.6%
EMU 9.5% 8.6% 10.4%
Source: European Commission - Fred
GDP and CPI: Average Yearly Changes. UNEMP: average
EMU is the weighted average of EMU initial 12 members
ment on the crisis period (2008-2015), one may notice that not only the
US outperformed the EMU in terms of real performance (GDP growth and
unemployment). But they also managed to keep inflation closer to the 2%
target that the two central banks share.
If we look in particular at unemployment, the US outperformed the EMU
since 1992 (figure 1). True, unemployment during the crisis increased remark-
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ably more with the crisis; but since then it has decreased to the pre-crisis
levels.
Figure 1: Unemployment Rates - 1992-2016
The US economic model has problems that just a casual look at some
macro variables cannot account for (instability and inequality, just to name
two). But it is undeniable that, from a macroeconomic viewpoint, it showed
strong dynamism, together with resilience during the crisis, that the EMU
has cruelly lacked.
The New Consensus highlights US market flexibility as an explanation
for the difference in performance. The excessive rigidity of EMU markets, in
particular labour markets, is a drag on firms’ dynamism and willingness to
hire workers. On top of that, as we saw, it reduces the capacity of the system
to return to the natural output following a shock. Tackling this rigidity would
therefore allow to reduce incentives’ distortions, and to convergence towards
a first best equilibrium. How strong is this argument?
3.2 Market Flexibility: Overrated?
It is hard to deny that labour and product markets in the Eurozone could be
streamlined and made more efficient. Yet, available evidence is somewhat at
odds with the New Consensus narrative that reforms are all that is needed
to improve economic performance.
In particular, if we look at labour markets, narrative does not take into
account recent developments. Table 2, taken from Creel and Saraceno (2010),
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reports the evolution of the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index,
computed by the OECD.
Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation Index
1985 1995 2005 2008 1985 1995 2005 2008
Austria 2.21 2.21 1.93 1.93 Italy 3.57 3.57 1.82 1.89
Belgium 3.15 3.15 2.18 2.18 Netherlands 2.73 2.73 2.12 1.95
Denmark 2.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 Portugal 4.19 3.85 3.46 3.15
Finland 2.33 2.16 2.02 1.96 Spain 3.82 3.01 2.98 2.98
France 2.79 2.98 3.05 3.05 Sweden 3.49 2.47 2.24 1.87
Germany 3.17 3.09 2.12 2.12 UK 0.6 0.6 0.75 0.75
Greece 3.56 3.5 2.73 2.73 US 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
Ireland 0.93 0.93 1.11 1.11 EMU11 - 2.75 2.23 2.2
Source: Creel and Saraceno (2010)
The EPL index, as imperfect as it is, may be taken as a broad mea-
sure of labour market flexibility (large numbers indicating more rigid labour
markets). While it is true that most European countries have high values
of the index, it is also true that they experienced drastic reduction in the
past years. Besides a shrinking pool of protected workers, EMU countries
have an increasing share of workers covered by multiple types of contract
(part-time, increasing protection, etc.) that are highly flexible. Thus, while
average labour protection may still be larger than in Anglo-Saxon countries,
protection of the marginal worker is by no means different. Firms wanting
to smooth business cycle fluctuations through labour utilization can easily
do it. Thus, labour market rigidity can hardly be seen as an obstacle for
European businesses to strive.
More generally, evidence on institutions and labour market performance
is weak and often contradictory so that the most cautious authors studying
the subject have to conclude that, for example, “the broad-brush analysis
that says that European unemployment is high because European labour
markets are ‘rigid’ is too vague and probably misleading” (Nickell 1997, p.73).
Paradoxically, the only convincing conclusion to emerge from the wide array
of studies devoted to the subject is that no single labour market institutional
setting proves to be superior to others and that success is determined by the
interaction of institutions with country-specific factors (Freeman 2000).
To sum up, while still popular in policy circles and in the media, the
Consensus narrative seems to have little support from the data. The op-
position of “flexible” United States and “rigid” European countries, seems
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more a snapshot of the past, than a feature of the present. While too much
emphasis is given to the Consensus narrative, another difference between the
Eurozone and the United States is too often neglected: Policy activism.
3.3 EMU Policy Inertia
The New Consensus, embedded in European institutions and practices since
the early 1990s, led European governments to give up active management
of the business cycle, and to engage in a non-cooperative strategy through
fiscal and social competition. Even before the global financial crisis hit the
world economy, the inertia of European policy makers in comparison with
their homologues across the ocean was striking. To assess monetary policy
activism, look at table 3, from Fitoussi and Saraceno (2011). The table shows








that in the pre-crisis period central bank rates in the US and in the Eurozone
have been on average very similar (only 60 basis points of difference). per
se, this is not informative, because the level of the interest rate has to be
determined in regard to inflation and output gap objectives, which may have
been different in the two zones. What is in fact striking, is the much higher
variability of interest rates in the United States, with the standard error
which is double with respect to the EMU, and a spread between the maximum
and the minimum value which is also significantly larger.
There is little doubt that even before the crisis the ECB was substan-
tially less proactive than the Fed. The ECB restraint could nevertheless be
explained by the need to compensate for excessively lax fiscal policies in the
Eurozone. This argument does not hold, nevertheless, if we look at table 4,
also from Fitoussi and Saraceno (2011). The table reports descriptive statis-
tics for the “fiscal impulse”, defined as the change in the primary structural
balance. This is the best, albeit imperfect, indicator of fiscal activism that
we have, because it captures non-cyclical changes (and hence discretionary)
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Table 4: Fiscal Impulse: Descriptive Statistics 1999-2007
GER ITA ESP FRA EMU4* UK USA JAP
Mean -0.15 0.04 -0.30 0.23 -0.03 0.51 0.44 -0.73
s.e. 1.80 1.20 0.65 0.58 0.90 2.69 1.28 1.86
Max 4.39 2.72 1.03 1.23 2.27 5.25 2.88 1.51
Min -2.08 -1.29 -1.09 -0.43 -0.70 -4.76 -0.92 -3.64
Source: Datastream - *EMU4 (Ger, Fra, Ita, Spa) is weighed with GDP
in the fiscal stance. Even if the US experienced higher growth on average
(table 1 above), over the period they had a more expansionary stance. More
importantly, as with monetary policy, the United States showed significantly
higher fiscal activism over the period than the EMU4 (an interesting excep-
tion being Germany). The standard error is significantly larger for the US
(and even more for the UK and for Japan) than for the EMU4.
The higher reactivity of American fiscal authorities is not surprising if we
consider that the US have a lower level of social protection and of automatic
stabilization, which calls for a more active role of macroeconomic policies
aimed at limiting the effects of harmful fluctuations of income (Creel and
Saraceno 2010). But there is more than that. Even if the European fiscal
rules (the SGP and now the Fiscal Compact) never yielded actual sanctions
in spite of the numerous infringements, their very existence was capable of
constraining governments’ action through peer pressure and a general repro-
bation attached to fiscal (and monetary) policy activism (Fitoussi and Sara-
ceno 2008).
3.4 The EMU Response to the Crisis: Too Little and
Too Late
If inertia characterized EMU policy sice the inception of the single currency,
the contrast with US policy activism is even more striking since the financial
crisis began.
The behaviour of fiscal and monetary autorities during the recent cri-
sis was consistent with their pre-crisis behaviour: They reluctantly reacted
to the financial crisis, quickly reverted to the New Consensus prescription
of limited intervention, and when they did eventually had to contrast the
deflationary trap, they did it, once again, “too little and too late”
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3.4.1 The Early Response
We said above (page 6) that at teh global level the crisis triggered a standard
“Keynesian sequence”: an early monetary response to the crisis, followed by
a fiscal expansion when monetary policy lost traction.
European countries did follow the same pattern, but more timidly than
the other advanced and emerging economies. Figure 2 shows that the Fed,
coonsistently with the behaviour summarized in table 3, reacted faster, and
more aggressively to the financial crisis, while the behaviour of the ECB rate
cut was much more gradual (and interrupted by two famously controversial
rate increases in 2008 and in 2011).
Figure 2: Central Bank Interest Rates 2007-2016
Similarly, when the economy hit the zero lower bound, the fiscal reaction
had the same sign across the board, but was bolder in the US and in the
other advanced economies. Figure 3 shows the fiscal impulse for the crisis
years. While the US just for the three years 2007-2009 had a cumulated fiscal
impulse of almost 5%, the EMU fiscal expansion began later, on a smaller
scale, and was substantially over by 2010.
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Figure 3: Structurally Primary Balance, % of GDP
3.4.2 Too Much and too Early: The 2010 Fiscal Stance Reversal
In October 2009 the newly elected Papandreou government announced that
Greece’s government was on the verge of collapse, after having misreported
public finance data for at least five years. European policy makers failed
to recognize the specificity of Greece’s troubles, and shifted their narrative
about the crisis from a private debt bubble to a story of fiscal profligacy by
a handful of peripheral countries (Sinn 2014).
In exchange for financial assistance from the EU and the IMF, countries
in distress had to implement draconian structural reforms and austerity plans
monitored by a Troika composed of the ECB, the European Commission, and
the IMF. Austerity was not limited to the periphery, though, as core countries
joined in the fiscal consolidation effort, that was seen to be the recipe for
growth. A good example of this unwarranted policy shift is Germany that,
in spite of the good health of its public finances engaged in a successful effort
to balance its budget by 2015.
Austerity was grounded on the New Consensus belief that fiscal multipli-
ers, the impact of government deficit on economic activity were rather low,
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certainly lower than one, and probably around 0.5. Thus, austerity was es-
timated to be only mildly recessionary in the short run, and expansionary
in the long run, when the government withdrawal from the economy would
unleash the potential of the economy. Some even claimed that austerity
would be expansionary in the short-run as well, drawing on the literature
started by the seminal work of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) on expansionary
fiscal consolidations: a fiscal contraction, improving confidence, triggers a
boom in private sector expenditure that more than compensates the drop of
government demand5.
Events did not unfold as planned: the fiscal stance reversal slowed down
the recovery worldwide, and in the Eurozone austerity plunged the economy
in a double-dip recession from which it has not yet fully recovered.
3.4.3 A Question of Timing
Fiscal consolidation was not an exclusive European matter. Going back to
figure 3,we may notice that the reversal of the fiscal stance also happened in
the US, and it was even more marked than in Europe.
We should therefore ask why, if austerity was generalized, only the Euro-
zone suffered from the double-dip recession. One may be tempted to argue,
in fact, that austerity cannot explain the difference in performance between
the EMU and the United States. The problem with that argument is that
fiscal consolidation needs not to be assessed in isolation, but in relation to
the environment in which it takes place. First, it started one year earlier
in the EMU, in 2010. Second, fiscal expansion had been more robust in
the US in 2008 and in 2009, thus avoiding that the economy slid too much:
having been bolder and more effective in 2008-2010, continued fiscal expan-
sion was less necessary in 2011-12, as the reduction of public demand in
the US accompanied the increase of private expenditure. In other words,
the United States government fully played the role of supporting aggregate
demand when needed, and withdrew only when private demand gained mo-
mentum, the very definition of countercyclical fiscal policy. Granted, the
recovery would probably have been stronger and faster if the fiscal stance
in the US had remained expansionary. It remains nevertheless true that the
fiscal contraction in the US only begun once the private sector showed at
least some capacity to walk alone.
In the EMU, public purchases of goods and services should have contin-
ued to increase to compensate the continuing reduction of private spending;
but this did not happen, with the result that fiscal policy ended up being
5The fact that this literature has been shown to be very country-specific, and substan-
tially proven wrong, was neglected by partisans of fiscal consolidation.
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countercyclical. Table 5 shows the correlation between public and private
expenditure in the two periods. While correlation does not imply causation,
Table 5: Correlation Between Public and Private Expenditure
2008-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015
EMU -0.96 0.73 0.99
USA -0.82 -0.96 -0.04
Source: Datastream
it indicates co-movement, and hence counter or pro cyclicality. The negative
correlation of the US for the two subperiods from 2008 to 2012, indicates
that public expenditure was withdrawn only when private expenditure could
take the witness, and never was procylclical (it turned neutral in 2013-2015).
Europe is a whole different story. Fiscal contraction began when the private
sector was not ready to take the witness, as the positive correlation (both for
2010-2012 and 2013-2015) indicates; the withdrawal of public demand there-
fore led to a plunge in economic activity and to the double-dip recession that
the US did not experience.
The failure of austerity and reforms to put the world economy on the
path of a robust recovery led the profession to reassess the New Consensus
dismissal of fiscal policy. In particular, the IMF drew lots of attention with
a box in its Fall 2012 World Economic Outlook, that was later developed by
its chief economist Olivier Blanchard (Blanchard and Leigh 2013). The IMF
made an outright mea culpa on the size of the multipliers, arguing that in a
deep downturn, and with monetary policy at the zero lower bound, their size
was closer to 2 than to 0.5. As a consequence, the contractionary impact of
fiscal consolidation had been larger than anticipated, and the recession made
austerity, not only costly, but also self-defeating with respect to the objective
to reduce the debt ratios.
Interestingly enough, in the EMU the debate opened by Blanchard and
Leigh did not really resonate, and the official discourse (consolidation cum re-
forms) did not change until very recently, when policy makers at the ECB and
at the Commission started asking for a fiscal expansion “within the bound-
ary set by the rules”. Nevertheless, faced with a stagnant economy EMU
(monetary) policy authorities had to change stance in 2014. But if austerity
has been too hastily embraced in 2010, the policy correction triggered by the
hannus horribilis 2014 came too late. And was too little.
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3.4.4 Too Little and too Late: Monetary Policy
When the world economy entered into a liquidity trap in 2009, and fiscal
policy took the witness, the ECB, like other central banks, kept an accom-
modating stance, but remained in the background. The ECB low profile
was not bound to last, though, because with the explosion of the Euro-
zone sovereign debt crisis, monetary policy came back to the forefront. The
double-dip recession was followed by a weak export-led recovery in 2013, and
by a new slide towards deflation in 2014.
Disappointing growth, and turmoil in sovereign debt markets, put enor-
mous strain on the Eurozone, threatening the very survival of the single
currency. The incapacity of European governments to coordinate in a bold
and coordinated response to both speculation and faltering growth, forced
the ECB to rush in order to avert disaster.
Interestingly enough, the path followed by the US was not very different.
The political gridlock in the US forced President Obama to reverse the fiscal
stance faster than he should have done it, and the Fed had to step in with
its quantitative easing program that provided support to the economy. But
similarities stop here. First, the United States have a federal structure, so
that transfers between states (unemployment benefits and tax receipts) con-
tribute to rebalancing asymmetric business cycles. Second, we saw (figure 3)
that the US stimulus had been significantly larger than the one implemented
by EU countries, so that its withdrawal was less ill-timed. Finally, while the
ECB was (and still is) constrained by the no bail-out clause, that prevents
it from directly purchasing sovereign bonds in the primary market, the Fed
has no such limitation. This means that while the Fed could act as a buyer
of last resort and purchase government debt, thus making default virtually
impossible (and keeping yields very low as a consequence), the ECB could
not perform this important role of insurer. Eurozone countries in trouble
therefore also had (and have) to fear speculation on their debt.
Since 2010 ECB action has been marked by three major interventions, all
of them made necessary by exceptional circumstances. The first is the Long
Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) program, launched in late 2011. Then,
in September 2012, the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) program.
Finally, more recently, Mario Draghi’s (2014) Jackson Hole speech, followed
by the ongoing EMU version of quantitative easing.
This is not the place to discuss the details of these programs (the inter-
ested reader can refer to Saraceno 2016). What is important to notice here
is that in the three cases, the ECB moved because the Eurozone was at the
edge of implosion, and mostly thanks to the impulsion of its president, Mario
Draghi, who was forced to twist arms in the Governing Council.
16
Opposition to ECB action went to the point of legal challenges in front
of the European Court of Justice (later dismissed), based on the claim that
the ECB had acted beyond its mandate. And Mario Draghi had to provide
an extensive interpretation of price stability (“the collapse of the euro would
have an impact on financial and price stability”) in order to implement the
measures needed to defuse speculation and to try to support the economy.
These skirmishes contribute to explain the delays and timidity of ECB action
during the crisis. A good example of this timidity is the EMU version of QE,
that started when the other central banks were already putting in place a
tapering strategy, and in spite of the communication effort of the ECB, is
limited in size (figure 4).
Figure 4: Central Bank Total Assets - December 2007=100
Mario Draghi’s (2014) Jackson Hole speech has for the first time invoked
the support of fiscal policy to fight deflationary pressures, a plea that since
then has been repeated in almost any speech. Nevertheless, the 2014 speech
also set the framework for this return of fiscal policy, that according to ECB
and Commission officials, should always remain bounded by the rules set
by the Stability Pact and the Fiscal Compact. The case for fiscal policy,
therefore, was de facto limited to a handful of countries, most of them (like
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e.g. Germany) not willing to use the available fiscal space. Thus, as we
write, the only concrete manifestation of fiscal policy in the EU is the Juncker
Plan, a EU wide investment scheme geared at increasing private investment
through co-financing of selected projects.
3.4.5 Too Little and too Late: Fiscal Policy
The purpose of the Juncker investment plan, announced in November 2014, is
to overcome the reluctance of private investors by relieving them, through co-
financing, of part of the financial risk associated with infrastructure projects6.
The plan, adopted by the European Parliament in June 2015, established
a European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) endowed with e21bn,
coming in part from the European budget (e16bn), and for the rest from
the European Investment Bank7. The Fund endowment should allow bond
issuance allowing to increase available funding to e60bn. These resources
will be topped by voluntary pledges from Member countries (that will not
be counted as deficit within the Stability Pact framework). Third-party
countries will also be allowed to contribute (China was the first to announce
its contribution, in September 2015). This amount is then to be used to
co-finance private investment projects for a total expected to reach e315bn
over the three years 2015-2017. Expected leverage is therefore rather large:
it is 5 if we take as a basis the e60bn the Fund should raise on markets;
but it climbs to a staggering 15 if we use as a basis for calculation the initial
endowment of e21bn.
The latest progress report by the Commission (July 2016) reportse20.4bn
engaged by the EFSI in approved projects (13.6 for infrastructures and 6.8
for SMEs). This should lead, with private funds topping the public contri-
butio, to mobilize around e116bn, more or less a third of the total of the
plan, one year into the three-year horizon. The plan is therefore on track in
terms of engaged resources.
Le Moigne, Saraceno, and Villemot (2016) use a simple inter-temporal
stochastic general equilibrium model with public capital and non-Ricardian
agents, to evaluate (a) the capacity of the Juncker plan to support the econ-
omy, enhancing private capital productivity; and (b)its ability to address the
Eurozone liquidity trap.
The authors carry on their analysis by comparing the Juncker Plan with
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), implemented by the
6This section builds in part on Le Moigne, Saraceno, and Villemot (2016).
7The EIB is in fact the driving force, as the EFSI is just a label for the EIB assets
linked to the plan (Claeys 2015).
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Obama administration in 2009.
Since it was announced, the Juncker plan was criticized as being “too
little and too late.” The simulations performed by Le Moigne et al. (2016)
confirm this criticism, and help making it more precise: Had the Juncker plan
been implemented in a timely manner, it would have helped to significantly
shorten the recession. Even the relatively small investment plan agreed upon
by the EU authorities could have had a positive impact, if implemented
before the economy got trapped in a liquidity trap.
But once the political process delayed the intervention, then EU author-
ities should have implemented a much bolder plan. As it is, the Juncker
plan is likely not going to be effective at all in lifting the economy out of
a deflationary trap that is solidly installed. Thus, Le Moigne et al. (2016)
rephrase the criticism of the plan as “probably too little, and certainly too
late”.
The announcement made on 14 September 2016 by Jean-Claude Juncker
that the Commission would propose to double the financial capacity of the
plan sounds like an acknowledgment of this criticism; however, this announce-
ment also comes too late to make any significant difference, especially as the
additional investments would be spread over a period far away in the future
(2018-2022).
The story of the Juncker Plan confirms, indirectly, that a major flaw in
European economic governance is its inability to respond quickly to shocks
hitting the economy. An institutional architecture and decision-making pro-
cess that could be adapted to the so-called “Great Moderation” (if it ever
existed), are certainly not fit for the new era of instability which began in
2008.
To summarize the argument so far, the New Consensus had a significant
impact on European institutions, and on the policies followed especially in
the single currency areas. The Consensus is enshrined in European insti-
tutions since the Maastricht Treaty. Discretionary policies are limited at a
bare minimum, while rules and government by the technocrats are preferred
to remove the obstacles towards the Pareto optimal equilibrium of the econ-
omy. EU institutions and practices yielded inertial macroeconomic policies
in Europe, even before the crisis hit in 2007.
The comparison with the Unites States shows that there the Consensus
policy prescriptions were watered down, especially during the crisis.8.
European institutions may prove even more unfit, in the coming years, if
the world economy were to remain in a state of stagnant demand even once
8French economist Jean-Paul Fitoussi usually says that the US are the main producer
of neo-liberal doctrine, but only for export and not for domestic consumption!
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the crisis is over.
4 Secular Stagnation: Implications for Fiscal
Policy
Because of its depth, and of its length, the crisis has triggered an interesting
discussion among economists about whether the advanced economies will
eventually return to the growth rates they experienced in the second half
of the twentieth century. One view, put forward by Robert Gordon (2012,
2016) focuses on supply-side factors. Gordon argues (not unchallenged, see
e.g. Phelps 2013) that each successive technological revolution has lower
potential impact, and that in this particular moment, faltering innovation
faces six headwinds likely to compress potential growth:
1. First, the demographic dividend in reverse motion, that imposes a bur-
den on public finances
2. Then, rising inequality (see Piketty 2013), that reduces human capital
accumulation
3. Third, the combined effect of globalization and the IT revolution, that
increased the part of goods and services that became tradable. This
in turn led to more competition in labour markets, and hence to lower
wages and labour productivity.
4. Fourth, the increasing cost of managing the consequences of global
warming, that also imposes a burden on public finances.
5. Fifth, the high burden of debt (public and private), bequeathed by the
crisis
6. Finally, more specific to the US, the deterioration of educational at-
tainment.
All the headwinds tend to reduce (mostly human) capital accumulation, and
hence future potential growth.
In a famous speech at the IMF in 2013, later developed in Summers
(2014), Larry Summers revived a term from the 1930s, “secular stagnation”,
to describe a dilemma facing advanced economies.
Summers develops some of Gordon’s arguments to argue that lower tech-
nical progress, slower population growth, the drifting of firms away from
debt-financed investment, all contributed to shifting the investment schedule
20
to the left. At the same time, the debt hangover, accumulation of reserves
(public and private) induced by financial instability, increasing income in-
equality (see also Fitoussi and Saraceno 2011), tend to push the savings
schedule to the right. The resulting natural interest rate is close to zero
if not outright negative, thus leading to a structural excess of savings over
investment.
Summers argues that most of the factors exerting a downward pressure on
the natural interest rate are not cyclical but structural, so that the current
situation of excess savings is bound to persist in the medium-to-long run,
and the natural interest rate may remain negative even after the current
cyclical downturn. The conclusion is not particularly reassuring, as policy
makers in the next several years will have to navigate between the Scylla
of accepting permanent excess savings and low growth (insufficient to dent
unemployment), and the and Charybdis of trying to fight secular stagnation
by fuelling bubbles that eliminate excess savings, at the price of increased
instability and risks of violent financial crises like the one we recently expe-
rienced.
The former IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard has elaborated on the
meaning of Summers’ conjecture for macroeconomic policy (Blanchard 2016).
If interest rates will remain at (or close to) zero even once the crisis will be
over, monetary policy will continuously face the dilemma of either sustaining
growth, at the risk of bringing asset prices and bubbles beyond the point of no
return that triggers a crisis; or to fight the formation of bubbles, at the price
of not being capable of lifting the economy out of secular stagnation. The
recent crisis is a good case study of this dilemma, with the two major central
banks of the world under fire from some quarters, for opposiite reasons: the
Fed for having kept interest rates too low, contributing to the housing bubble
(Rajan 2010); and the ECB for having done too little and too late during
the Eurozone crisis (Saraceno 2016).
Drifting away from the Consensus that he contributed to consolidate (see
e.g. Blanchard 2009), Blanchard concludes that exclusive reliance on mone-
tary policy for macroeconomic stabilization should be reassessed. With low
interest rates that make debt sustainability a non-issue; with financial mar-
kets deregulation that risks yielding more variance in GDP and economic
activity; and with monetary policy (almost) constantly at the Zero Lower
Bound, fiscal policy should regain a prominent role among the instruments
for macroeconomic regulation, beyond the cycle. This is a very important
methodological advance, that should nevertheless be completed with an ex-
plicit reference to a “new” fiscal policy doctrine.
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On a related point, Adam Posen (2016) argues that fiscal policy may be
a powerful tool for structural reform. Commenting the recent fiscal stim-
ulus package announced by the Japanese government, Posen notices that
fiscal policy is being used to boost labour market participation (most no-
tably among women, through investment in day care, and tax breaks for
secondary income earners); this is expected to boost future potential growth,
thus establishing a further link between short-term stabilization policies and
long-term growth. Posen notes furthermore that in spite of its high public
debt, the announcement of Japan’s new stimulus package has been followed
with decreasing treasury yields, signalling that when fiscal policy is well de-
signed, markets are not against government intervention.
Nevertheless, in his plea for fiscal policy, Blanchard falls short of a conclu-
sion that naturally stems from his own reading of secular stagnation: If the
economy is bound to remain stuck in a semi-permanent situation of excessive
savings, and if monetary policy is incapable of reabsorbing the imbalance,
then a new role for fiscal policy may appear, that goes beyond the short-term
stabilization that Blanchard and Summers envision. In fact, there are two
ways to avoid that the ex ante excess savings results in a depressed economy:
either one runs semi-permanent negative external savings (i.e. a current ac-
count surplus), or one runs semi-permanent government negative savings.
The first option, the export-led growth model that Germany is succeeding to
generalize at the EMU level, is not viable, except for an individual country
implementing non cooperative strategies, because aggregate current account
balances need to be zero.
The second option, a semi-permanent government deficit, needs to be
further investigated, especially in its implication for EMU macroeconomic
governance
5 Adapting EMU Institutions
There are a number of ways, not necessarily politically feasible, to allow
EMU countries to run semi-permanent government deficits. A first one could
be to restore complete national budget sovereignty, (scrapping the Stability
Pact). This would mean relying on market discipline alone for maintaining
fiscal responsibility. As an alternative, to the opposite side of the spectrum,
countries could create a federal expenditure capacity (which would imply the
creation of an EMU finance minister with capacity to spend, the issuance of
Eurobonds, etc.). Such an option is as unrealistic as the previous one. In
an ideal world, the crisis and deflation would be dealt with by means of a
vast European investment program, financed by the European budget and
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through Eurobonds. Infrastructures, green growth, the digital economy, are
just some of the areas for which the optimal scale of investment is European,
and for which a long-term coordinated plan would necessary. The increasing
mistrust among European countries exhausted by the crisis, and the fierce
opposition of Germany and other northern countries to any hypothesis of
debt mutualisation, make this strategy virtually impossible.
The solution must therefore be found at national level, without giving
up European-wide coordination, which would guarantee effective and fiscally
sustainable investment programs.
5.1 The Golden Rule
In general, the multiplier associated with public investment is larger than
the overall expenditure multiplier. This is particularly true in times of crisis,
when the economy is, like today, at the zero-lower bound. Interestingly
enough, in these cases, projects with longer time to build should be preferred:
when the economy is at the ZLB, monetary policy reaction is muted, and
the only way to decrease real interest rates is inflation. The supply side
deflationary impact of public investment is therefore problematic because
it increases the real interest rate, and when it is delayed public investment
becomes more effective in lifting the economy out of the zero lower bound
(Le Moigne et al. 2016).
Dervis and Saraceno (2014) recently proposed that the EMU adopts a
fiscal rule similar to the one implemented in the UK by Chancellor of the
Exchequer Gordon Brown in the 1990s, and applied until 2009. The new
rule would require countries to balance their current budget, while financ-
ing public capital accumulation with debt. Investment expenditure, in other
words, would be excluded from deficit calculation, a principle that timidly
emerges also in the Juncker plan (for details, see Creel et al. 2009. Such a
rule would stabilize the ratio of debt to GDP, it would focus efforts of public
consolidation on less productive items of public spending, and would ensure
intergenerational equity (future generations would be called to partially fi-
nance the stock of public capital bequeathed to them). Last, but not least,
especially in the current situation, putting in place such a rule would not re-
quire treaty changes, and it is already discussed, albeit timidly, in EU policy
circles.
The golden rule is not a new idea, and in the past it has been criticized
(see e.g. Balassone and Franco 2000) on the ground that it introduces a bias
in favor of physical capital and penalize certain expenses like for example
education and health care that - while classified as current - are crucial for
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future growth.
This criticism, however, can be turned around and transformed into a
strength. Dervis and Saraceno propose that at regular intervals, for example
in connection with the European budget negotiation, the Commission, the
Council and the Parliament could find an agreement on the future priori-
ties of the Union, and make a list of areas or expenditure items exempted
from deficit calculation for the subsequent years. Joint programs between
neighbouring countries could be encouraged by providing co-financing by
the European Investment Bank. The modified Golden Rule would in fact
yield a return, on a European scale, to industrial policy, a political and
democratic determination of the long term growth objectives of the EU. The
entrepreneurial State, through public investment, could once again become
the centrepiece of a large-scale European industrial policy, capable of imple-
menting physical as well as intangible investment. Waiting for a real federal
budget, the bulk of investments would remain responsibility of national gov-
ernments, in deference to the principle of subsidiarity. But the modified
golden rule would coordinate and guide them towards the development and
the well-being of the Union as a whole.
Dervis and Saraceno argue that the implementation of a golden rule of
this kind would serve the purpose of focusing on the nature and quality
of public spending in relation to the growth objective. It would also force
European policymakers jointly to have a periodic and transparent discussion
on the investment needs of their economies, and to coordinate policies as
part of a process that would increase participation, cohesion and legitimacy
in the Eurozone.
The financing of persistent deficits would not be a problem as long as
excess savings exist. It would only be a matter of channelling savings into
government bonds without creating instability. A number of recent proposals
may be considered: for example “restricted” special public investment bonds
(Koo 2011; Fazi and Iodice 2016), to avoid or limit speculative flows. In the
very short run, the financing of pan-European projects through EIB bond
issuance financed within the QE program. Finally to the other extreme, the
issuance of perpetual bonds (Sachs 2014; Flaherty et al. 2016), would allow
a de facto monetization of debt. Interestingly enough, accepting these bonds
as collateral, central banks would ensure that they become desirable even
when market return is substantially lower than social return
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6 Conclusion
For almost three decades, the EMU has been the laboratory of the New
Consensus through institutions, and policies, that put much emphasis on the
capacity of markets to absorb shocks better than macroeconomic policies.
This paper has argued that the crisis, challenging the consensus, has proven
that situations of excessive savings may emerge and be persistent, giving
Keynes’ General Theory a second youth, eighty years after its birth. I have
drawn the institutional consequences, for the EMU, of this developments, and
argued for the adoption of a fiscal rule allowing quasi-permanent government
deficits to match the quasi-permanent private sector excess savings. This
seems the only EMU reform that couples an economic rationale (filling a
semi-permanent investment gap) with some chances of being adopted by the
EU divided and uninspired leaders.
In conclusion, nevertheless, I would want to state that a Golden Rule
would remain a second best, with respect to unconstrained fiscal policies. It
is after all paradoxical that the New Consensus, while arguing in favour of
overall market efficiency, does not seem capable of trusting the very markets
it assumes efficient with the task of disciplining government fiscal policy, and
punishing deviations from “wise” fiscal behaviours. Said differently, tertium
non datur : either we prone market efficiency, but then markets should be
capable of inducing government discipline, making rules unnecessary; or we
acknowledge that markets may be inefficient in enforcing fiscal discipline,
but then we are led to conclude with Keynes that discretionary policies are
necessary for a well-functioning economy.
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